The approval of the Soviet government in the center and in the field. Denikin. Ataman Krasnov. HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA - USSR

SOVIET RUSSIA. Brief history of the USSR



The approval of the Soviet government in the center and in the field. Denikin. Ataman Krasnov


The military actions of the Soviet authorities and their opponents in the autumn and winter of 1917-1918. were local in nature and were caused not so much by class and social confrontation after the October events, as by the continuation of the struggle for power in the new conditions. The elimination of the Provisional Government led to a new clash of forces, previously divided by an unstable, vacillating bourgeois-liberal center. Typical opponents of the Bolsheviks during this period were the same forces that suffered a partial defeat in August 1917. The interrupted process of armed confrontation was continued in October 1917. Right-wing forces could now act more decisively, without regard to the liberal bourgeoisie.


The relative ease of seizing power by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd did not mean so easy victories in other cities and provinces. The victory was won at the expense of the superconceptration of the probolnevi-stake forces in the capital and the unconditional weakness of the government of A. F. Kerensky. Now, the Bolsheviks had to deal not only and not so much with the territories previously controlled by the Provisional Government, but with the outlined territorial-national formations that previously only nominally recognized the political power of the former bourgeois government (Ukraine, Finland, the Caucasus, Cossack territories) . It turned out to be much easier to overthrow the Provisional Government than to defend itself from claims to power on the ground by other parties and movements that had previously refused to support the fallen regime.


The assertion of the Soviet authorities in north-west Russia and in the Central Industrial Region, with the exception of Moscow, did not encounter serious military resistance, which was caused by a high concentration of the industrial proletariat, proximity to the Bolshevik centers and the Soviet authorities had the ability to deploy their armed forces in a well-developed and a controlled railway network. The expansion of the new government from the capitals to the nearby territories was also successful due to the fact that here the small forces were not always opposed by successive supporters of the Provisional Government. Seeing a force capable of uniting and leading the country, the Bolsheviks sided with a whole group of officers of the old army, from General MD Bonch-Bruyevich to Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Muravyev (one of the authors of the idea of ​​the shock battalions in 1917).


The hike on October 26-30, 1917 to Petrograd by General P. N. Krasnov and A. F. Kerensky had only temporary success, manifested in the seizure of Gatchina on October 27 and Tsarskoe Selo on October 28, reduced to no on October 30, when several hundred Cossacks, eight hundred junkers and drummers, an artillery division and an armored train were opposed by 8 thousand red guards and sailors with the support of fleet artillery (general management - M. A. Muravyov). The capitulation of the Cossacks on November 1, 1917 was inevitable under such conditions, as was the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks on November 3 in Moscow, after the transfer of the 5,000-strong Soviet detachment there.


The military resistance to the new regime, somewhat revived in November, was paralyzed after the Soviet forces led by N.V. Krylenko occupied the Stavka in Mogilev on November 20, 1917. Waiting at the Stavka for the fall of the Bolsheviks in a natural way turned out to be a mistake, and the delayed reaction was the very beginning.


The death of General N. N. Dukhonin, raised on bayonets, and the hasty escape of those who were nearby imprisoned in Bykhov after the August speech by L. G. Kornilova, A. I. Denikin, and other “bykhovtsevs” acknowledged the futility struggle with bolshevizm in the central and western regions of Russia. The move of the above-mentioned persons to the south was natural, it was here that the forces opposing the Soviet government were concentrated in the Cossack territories. The Chief of Staff of the Stavka General Staff Headquarters appointed General M. D. Bonch-Bruyevich, who was loyal to Soviet power, to the General Staff.


In the center of Russia, where a homogeneous Russian population prevailed, the Soviet government won out more easily than on the outskirts, where it was opposed not by individual fragments of the previous government, but by real forces, having quite wide support among the multinational population of the suburbs and the five-million Cossacks. Soviet power struggled in these territories not only with centrifugal forces, but also with a clearly identified counter-revolutionary movement. The most powerful and dangerous were the movements of the Cossacks in the Don and the Southern Urals, headed by atamans A. M. Kaledin and A. I. Dutov.


An active participant in the events of August 1917, agitating on the Don for Kornilov, General Kaledin already on October 25, 1917, assumed control in the Don region. On October 27, Kaledin announced the transfer of the Region of the Don Army to martial law and invited the Provisional Government to Novocherkassk to organize the struggle against the Bolsheviks.


Kaledin entered into an alliance with the Ukrainian Central Rada, established contacts with the Cossack leadership of Orenburg, Kuban, Astrakhan, Te-river, with the leaders of the leading bourgeois parties, P. N. Milyukov, M. V. Rodzyanko.


Relying on the approximately 15,000-strong armed forces, on December 2, Kaledin seized Rostov-on-Don, two days later Taganrog, soon controlling a large part of Donbass. At the same time, the Kaledinians emerged outside the Cossack territories in December 1917. led to an increase in the conflict between the Cossacks and the local population. The transfer of Soviet troops from near Kharkov and Voronezh provided a break in the course of military actions.


The situation was aggravated by the uprising in the rear of Kaledin, unrest among the Cossacks themselves, which resulted in mass desertion. Kaledin was now confronted not only by the Soviet troops, the working population of the cities, but also the Don Cossack Revolutionary Command formed on January 10, 1918, led by FG ​​Podtelkov and M. V. Krivoshlykov. The total number of troops concentrated against Kaledin reached 20-25 thousand people.


Kaledin's defeat was all the more predetermined because by the end of January, Soviet troops had already achieved decisive success against other participants in the anti-Soviet movement in the nearby territories. Speaking on October 27 at the same time as Kaledin and capturing Orenburg on November 14, and later Troitsk and Verkhneuralsk, the ataman Dutov left Orenburg under the onslaught of the red troops on January 18 and retired to Verkhneuralsk. The Central Rada troops suffered one after another defeat from the Soviet troops, relying on the support of the Ukrainian Ukrainian government formed in Kharkov on December 14. On January 14, M.A. Muravyev’s troops occupied Kiev, and the further existence of Ra-dy was possible only thanks to the support of Germany.


On January 28, parts of R. F. Sievers liberated Taganrog, many other Kaledin strongholds were already in the hands of Soviet troops. January 29, 1918 Kaledin shot himself. Further advance of the Soviet troops to Novocherkassk was delayed by units of the Volunteer Army (formed on 25 December 1917) led by L. G. Kornilov. The superiority of the Soviet troops caused the withdrawal of parts of the Voluntary Army. At the end of February, the last centers of resistance were taken: Rostov-on-Don (February 23) and Novocherkassk (February 25). The remnants of the Kaledinian troops retreated to the Salsk steppes, while the Voluntary Army moved to the Kuban.


The total number of troops with whom he embarked on the Kuban Kornilov, was about 4 thousand people. Received the name of the "Ice campaign", the raid was aimed at reuniting with the troops of the Kuban government, which, however, on the day of the speech (March 13) left Yekinerino. Despite the obvious preponderance of the Soviet units concentrated in large cities and railway hubs, Kornilov's troops managed to break through, avoiding collision with large detachments.


Consistently destroying small and medium Soviet detachments, which prevented the advancement of troops, were guided by the order of Kornilov: "Do not take prisoners! The more terror, the more victories!" On March 27, the Kornilov units (about 2,300 people) and the Kuban detachments of V. L. Pokrovsky (3,000 people) joined and replenished with local troops. On March 30, Kornilov took command of the combined forces and on April 8 attacked Yekaterinodar from the north, despite the superior strength of the Soviet garrison.


The failure of the first assault did not stop Kornilov, and he began preparations for the second, during which on April 13, 1913, he was killed by a random projectile. M. V. Alekseev and A. I. Denikin, who received the command, gave the order to withdraw troops. The remnants of the Volunteer army relocated again to the Don, where Soviet troops were under the pressure of ataman Krasnov and Germany that supported him. The spring advance of the German troops in Ukraine divided the warring parties and allowed the Volunteer Army to reorganize its troops in more favorable conditions


History of the Soviet Union and Russia in the 20th Century





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