Malenkov. Khrushchev. Socio-economic development of the USSR. THE HISTORY OF SOVIET RUSSIA - USSR

SOVIET RUSSIA. Brief history of the USSR



Malenkov. Socio-economic development of the USSR


In the first years after Stalin’s death, a new course in the field of economic policy was associated with the name of G. M. Malenkov. At his suggestion, accents in the sphere of national economy were transferred from heavy industry to light construction, housing construction and agriculture. Nevertheless, the situation in the village continued to remain critical. Khrushchev somewhat later admits that for the period from 1948 to 1953 "the gross harvest and grain procurement did not substantially increase." Mokala production also did not grow, and average annual meat production was below the level reached by the country before the war.


At the September 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev publicly began a conversation about the problems of agriculture. Soon the procurement prices for agricultural products were raised and the principle of material interest of the village workers began to be reinstated. In addition, debts were written off from collective farms, taxes from household plots decreased, the percentage of mandatory state deliveries decreased. A number of steps were taken to strengthen agriculture by cadres of specialists, a new planning procedure was established, encouraging the initiative of the collective farmers, allowing them to plan their social economy. The state not only sent thousands of tractors to the tree, but also significantly increased subsidies for agriculture.


At the end of January 1954, Khrushchev submitted to the Presidium of the Central Committee a note on the state and prospects for the development of agriculture. In it, he stated that there was a deep crisis in the village, stating that in 1953 less grain was harvested in the country than in 1940. The essence of the first secretary’s proposals was the need to expand arable land by developing 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow lands , as well as increasing the proportion of corn crops. On January 30, a meeting was held at the CPSU Central Committee on the prospects for land development in Kazakhstan. The former party leadership of the republic was heavily criticized. At the same time, Khrushchev argued that in Kazakhstan "chicken gives more income than a horse." P.K. Ponomarenko and L.I. Brezhnev were appointed new leaders of the party organization in Kazakhstan. At the February-March plenum of the Central Committee of 1954, the development of virgin lands was recognized as the main direction of agricultural development.


After several years of virgin epic, instead of 13 million hectares of land, according to the plan, 33 million hectares were plowed. In the record grain harvest of 1956, which reached 125 million tons, the share of virgin bread was about 40%. But along with the positive aspects in the development of virgin lands, the other side was revealed. The problem of the delivery of grain from producing areas to consuming severely complicated off-road conditions. The situation was aggravated by the high costs of transporting equipment, fuel, construction materials, the lack of storage tanks, and the poor organization of hundreds of thousands of people who had moved towards the development of virgin lands. The fact that the developed areas were to a large extent the areas of high-risk farming, where droughts and dusty tornadoles were not uncommon, were missed from the view.


Simultaneously with the expansion of virgin crops, a campaign began to increase Ku-Kuru’s crops. The area of ​​land set aside for this culture should have coincided with the originally determined area of ​​the newly developed territories in Northern Kazakhstan, the Southern Urals and Siberia. Khrushchev's interest in the cultivation of maize became apparent long before he visited the R. R. Garst farmer farm in the US state of Iowa in 1959. In the USSR, this grass began to be introduced by force, without listening to any explanation. It was necessary to make room not only proven forage crops, but also grain. So, in the Leningrad region (far from the most favorable in terms of its climatic conditions for such experiments) in 1955, 15 thousand hectares of land was occupied by corn. Moreover, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR reported that “the best in soil fertility with the introduction of organic and mineral fertilizers” were set aside for sowing. The results of the 1955 g experiment turned out to be deplorable. There was no germination at all at 20% of the planted areas, at 24% - they were highly irregular, at 37.5% - in a satisfactory condition, at 11.5% - in good ( with a plant height of more than 1 m), and for 8% of the area-dei shoots had to mow on a green top dressing.


Workers and employees of Leningrad and the region were actively involved in agricultural work. Manual watering of corn was organized. Despite the failure, they did not dare to abandon the "corn campaign". In September 1960, the executive committee of the Leningrad Council approved the provision for awarding the title of "The Best Cornman of the Leningrad Region", which was to be awarded for the progress achieved in sowing and harvesting this crop. Only after Khrushchev’s resignation did the corn fashion disappear. However, another inflection was allowed - corn had to be defended even in those areas where the “king of the fields” had been cultivated for many years in a row.


Improving the efficiency of agriculture remained one of the main tasks of the government. This should have been facilitated by the implementation of two administrative reforms. On February 26, 1958, on the report of Khrushchev at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a resolution was adopted "On the further development of the collective farm system and the reorganization of the machine and tractor stations." The essence of the innovation was that since 1958, new tractors, agricultural machines and implements were freely sold to collective farms for cash or with the provision of credit for these purposes. Collective farms, which, when purchasing equipment in the MTS, could not fully pay for its purchase, received installment payments of up to 2-3 years, and in some cases up to 5 years. In practice, the liquidation of MTS was unprofitable for the majority of collective farms, which were forced to spend all their financial resources. In 1958-1961 for the first time in the last 30 years, a decrease in the fleet of agricultural machines was observed in the country. Being in the use of collective farms, the equipment quickly broke down, and the necessary repair and technical services could not be created in time.


Khrushchev's other undertaking concerned the consolidation of collective farms, which was undertaken as far back as 1950. This measure was supposed to lead to the formation of powerful collective-farm unions capable of solving the greatest tasks. By 1955, the number of collective farms in the country had decreased to 83 thousand, by 1958 - to 78 thousand, and in 1960 - to 45 thousand. Despite the assurances of the government that "modern integrated collective farms are technically equipped much better than before, and the incomes of the collective farmers “rose sharply,” the situation in agriculture remained difficult. In the late 50s. marked slowdown in the growth rate of production.


In the Khrushchev Decade, the policy of decentralization of governance was implemented with particular insistence. By 1956, about 15 thousand industrial enterprises had been transferred to the republics. This transformation was crowned by the reform initiated by the first secretary in 1957. At the February plenum of the Central Committee, a resolution was adopted, the essence of which was to liquidate industrial ministries and create territorial government bodies - economic councils (CHF). In May 1957, the Supreme Council voted in favor of this decision. In a short time, the territory of the Soviet Union was divided into 105 administrative and economic districts, and the YLF began to form there. At the end of 1962 - the beginning of 1963, the consolidation of economic councils was carried out (in February 1963 there were 47 of them) in order to improve local planning. However, the expected effect of these transformations did not follow, which was soon the reason for the liquidation of these bodies, the discrediting of the very concept of "territorial administration", as well as the ideas embodied in it.


The end of the 50s. became the end of the period in the economic policy of Khrushchev, which was characterized by the growth rate of development in many sectors of the national economy. Gradually began to gain momentum braking processes. At the end of January 1959, the 21st Congress of the CPSU was convened, which adopted a seven-year plan for the development of the national economy for 1959-1965. The plan set specific goals - “catch up and overtake” America and come out on top in the world in terms of production per capita. For 7 years, it was planned to increase the volume of gross agricultural output by 1.7 times. Labor productivity on collective farms was supposed to increase by 2 times, and on state farms — by 55-60%. State capital investments in agriculture were provided in the amount of 150 billion rubles.


In the wake of numerous plans and commitments, leaders emerged who, by means of deception, tried to create an inflated authority for themselves. So, in 1959, the first secretary of the Ryazan Regional Committee of the CPSU, A. N. Larionov, assumed obligations for the procurement and sale of meat products to the state, which were 3 times more than the planned figures. As a result, with great difficulty, the region fulfilled 2 plans, but by addition it indicated in the report that the commitments were fully fulfilled. In December 1959, Lario Nova was awarded the title Hero of Socialist Labor. After the disclosure of fraud in September 1960, he was relieved of his post, and then committed suicide. "Ryazan business" caused damage to the livestock of collective and state farms in the region, while questioning the possibility of achieving high targets. However, in the early 60s. launched a campaign on the ideological justification of the intended results.


At the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the third party program — the program of building a communist society in the USSR — was made public (the first program was adopted at the II congress of the RSDLP in 1903, the second at the VIII congress of the RCP (B.) In 1919). The fact that socialism won a complete victory in our country was announced already in 1959; The creation of the material and technical base of communism for 10 years (1961-1971) was proclaimed. For the 1971-1980-ies. it was planned to switch to a single common national property, to the implementation of the principle of distribution according to the needs and construction of a “mainly” communist society. Even concrete figures were “calculated” to build communism at the designated time. Thus, the volume of industrial production for 20 years should have increased no less than 6 times. For this purpose, labor productivity was supposed to be raised more than 2 times in 10 years, and in 20 years - to double the current level of labor productivity in the United States. It was planned to reduce the working week to 35 hours, at the expense of society to provide free maintenance of children in the gardens, introduce free use of apartments, utilities, transport, etc.


Contrary to forecasts, the communist romanticism of the third program of the CPSU was not supported by real achievements. Moreover, in the early 1960s. The government took an unpopular step - announced price increases. On May 31, 1962, the Central Committee of the CPSU informed the population about the increase in purchase prices for livestock, poultry, butter and cream from June 1 by 35%. At the same time, retail prices increased by 25-30%. In order to at least somehow smooth out the unfavorable impression of the rise in prices of foodstuffs, the decree announced reduction of prices for sugar, fabrics made from viscose fibers and wool yarn.


The decision to raise prices immediately led to speeches in a number of cities: Riga, Kiyev, Chelyabinsk, Leningrad, and others. But the workers' discontent reached its apogee in Novocherkassk on June 1-3, 1962. The strike of the workers turned into a demonstration, which was shot by the troops mi The authorities at all levels immediately described the statement as a sally of criminal elements. The chairman of the KGB, V. S. Semichastny, informed the party leadership that 22 people were killed and died from injuries during the riots, and 87 turned to city hospitals in connection with injuries. In the city there were arrests of participants of the speech. On August 20, 1962, a trial began in Novocherkassk, at which the case of 14 activists of the June events was considered. 7 people were sentenced to death, the rest received 10-15 years in prison.


Thus, the economic transformation of Khrushchev at the turn of the 50-60s. started to crash. The monetary reform carried out in 1961 did not lead to an improvement in the life of the population. In the national economy continued to decline. In agriculture, they fell from 7.6% per annum at the stage of 1953-1958. up to 1.5% in the period 1959-1964 Labor productivity growth over the same years decreased from 9% to 3%. In 1963, the Soviet Union was forced to begin the purchase of grain abroad. In the first year, 12 million tons were purchased, which cost the state $ 1 billion.


Not limited to attempts at restructuring the economic organs, in November 1962, at a plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev decided to divide the party organs into industrial and agricultural ones. It was assumed that the production principle, which forms the basis for the construction of party agencies, would provide more concrete guidance to the economy. On the ground, 2 regional party committees were formed, 2 independent councils of deputies of workers and their executive committee. Some were supposed to serve the population employed in industry, and others in agriculture. Putting forward the idea of ​​a new reform, Khrushchev emphasized that this structure would not give the desired results, if not to put energetic, talented people in the leadership. At the same time, they acknowledged unacceptable vicious practice, when unfit workers remained for long periods in leadership positions.


The attempt to achieve more effective economic management, undertaken at the end of the “Khrushchev Decade”, was not successful. It only led to a weakening of the position of the first secretary. A large army of party functionaries felt anxiety about their positions. The Presidium of the Central Committee began to fear that in the future it will have to deal exclusively with economic tasks.


Despite all the contradictions and difficulties of the Khrushchev era, this decade was marked by a number of significant achievements: over the years of the seven-year period, the country's housing stock grew by 40%, in 1964, pensions for collective farmers were introduced for the first time. However, the political and economic activities of Khrushchev contributed to the weakening of his positions. The influence of the opposition grew, and the striving to get rid of the "indefatigable reformer" intensified.



History of the Soviet Union and Russia in the 20th Century

Nikita Khrushchev


Nikita Khrushchev

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