In 1949-1953 at the head of the USSR Foreign Ministry was the "Stalinist prosecutor" A. Ya. Vyshinsky, who made a career during the trials of "pests" and "enemies of the people" in the late 1920s and 1930s. From 1940 he held the post of Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs. As Deputy VM Molotov, he completed a number of important assignments, often coming directly from Stalin. Having become foreign minister in March 1949, Vyshinsky became involved in Stalin’s erroneous decision to boycott the UN Security Council after the demand for the rights of the PRC in the United Nations was rejected. The absence of a Soviet representative in the Security Council at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War cost our diplomacy dearly. The Americans undertook a UN flag in Korea. Naturally, not only the political course of the USSR, but also the external non-political actions of this time were dictated by Stalin, who regulated and directed decision-making on key issues.

Boorish attitude Vyshinsky to subordinates knew no bounds. He could easily have called the venerable professor, the expert of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "a fool, an idiot and a jerk." The head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs himself admitted that "to work a year in my secretariat is the same as serving seven years in prison." In March 1953, Molotov again became head of the Foreign Ministry. Vyshinsky, after the arrest of his long-time patron Beria, was, in the words of A. A. Gromyko, "in a kind of prostration" and soon died.

In the new leadership, the point of view of Khrushchev, Mikoyan and some other leaders gradually increased, according to which the opposition of the blocs was not inevitable. The possibility of the peaceful coexistence of the two systems was recognized. A certain weakening of the positions of the old Stalinist guards also contributed to a change in policy in foreign policy. Already in the summer of 1954, Khrushchev, despite opposition from Molotov, began to prepare rapprochement with Yugoslavia. From May 26 to June 3, 1955, the Soviet delegation, consisting of Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan, was in Belgrade and conducted tense negotiations on the normalization of relations with the leadership of this country. Ultimately, on June 2, a joint Soviet-Yugoslav declaration was made, admitting that the issues of the internal life of a state belong exclusively to the competence of its government.

One of the first attempts of Khrushchev to establish contacts with the great capitalist powers was the Geneva meeting of the leaders of the four powers, which took place in July 1955. No significant results were reached during the negotiations. At the same time, the isolation that existed around the Soviet Union was disturbed. Great Britain invited the leadership of the USSR to complain about the country. The trip of Khrushchev and Bulganin to the British Isles, their talks with members of the English government in April 1956 also did not bring anything new to the positions of the parties. In the course of meetings and conversations only a clarification of various points of view took place. Khrushchev, as usual, was naporist, explained to everyone that the era of rockets had come. Then one, then another interlocutor, he began to find out if he knows how many nuclear warheads will be needed in order to destroy his country. The British, as hospitable hosts, organized for the Soviet delegation a demonstration of military aviation on the basis of the royal air force.

"The Spirit of Geneva" was present at other international meetings of the mid-50s. In September 1955, German Chancellor K. Adenauer visited the USSR. Diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. The USSR decided to release the last prisoners held in prisons and camps as war criminals (the total number of prisoners of war of Wehrmacht officers and officers in the Soviet Union exceeded 3 million people. Of these, 1.1 million people died in the camps. The rest 1945-1955 returned home). In 1955, the USSR also signed an agreement on the nature of relations with the GDR, thereby giving East Germany the freedom to solve problems of foreign and domestic policy. The agreement provided for close cooperation of partners in all areas of public and political life.

Thus, in the mid-50s. the foundations of a stable post-war Europe were laid, which nevertheless consisted of two opposing blocs. On May 10, 1955, the Soviet government submitted to the UN a proposal to reduce armaments, prohibit atomic weapons and eliminate the threat of a new war. At the same time, the process of formalizing the military-political union of socialist countries was going on, which was completed on May 14, 1955 through the creation of the Warsaw Pact.

The efforts of Soviet diplomacy found a response in France. In March 1960, President de Gaulle invited Khrushchev to visit Paris. After the visit of the Soviet leader, relations between our countries improved significantly.

Establishing closer ties with both the West and the East remained one of the main goals of Soviet diplomacy. In October 1956, the USSR restored diplomatic relations with Japan, signing in Moscow a declaration on ending the state of war between the two countries. It was decided to return to the homeland of all Japanese citizens convicted in the Soviet Union (a total of 600 to 640 thousand Japanese turned out to be in Soviet captivity after the end of World War II). The USSR also refused reparation claims against Japan.

The Soviet government developed special relations with third world countries, where there were influential communist parties. The USSR continued to assist the people of Vietnam in its struggle against the colonizationists and took an active part in holding the Geneva meeting of foreign ministers in 1954. Under the direct influence of the USSR, the People's Republic of China and some other countries, France stopped the war against the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia .

In 1955, a Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India, where in 1950 a republic was proclaimed. The meetings with the ideologist and founder of the Indian National Congress, D. Nehru, served as the beginning of fruitful cooperation between the USSR and India. Moscow helped Delhi to create heavy industry, supplied weapons, trained officers, carried out mutually beneficial trade.

The Soviet Union did not hesitate to provide political, economic and military assistance to all countries that defended their right to independence. Thus, in 1956, when Egypt underwent triple Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal, carried out by the Egyptian government, the USSR made a number of diplomatic efforts to stop the interference of the West in the internal affairs of Cairo. Relations between the USSR and Egypt and further developed in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation. The head of the Egyptian government, Gamal Abder Nasser, in 1964 was even awarded the gold star of the Hero of the Soviet Union to Khrushchev. The USSR rendered great economic assistance to Egypt (the construction of the Aswan Dam and the Hydroelectric Power Station on the Nile), sent weapons and military advisers to this country.

In 1956, major changes took place in the USSR Foreign Ministry. Molotov lost his post. In his approaches to the problems of foreign policy, he was distinguished above all by his “inflexible class” position. He viewed relations with states of a different social order as a struggle in which softness is unforgivable. Molotov can not be considered a thin diplomat. Often during long meetings, he responded to various arguments of the interlocutor, like a gramophone, literally repeating the same formula that was originally pronounced. It was not for nothing that the nickname “Mr. No” was firmly established in international and political circles.

In June 1956, Molotov (due to the apparent divergence of his position on foreign policy issues with Khrushchev's point of view) as Minister of Foreign Affairs was replaced by D. T. Shepilov, the former editor-in-chief of Pravda and an expert on political economy. Being a protege of Khrushchev, he actively maintained and developed his flexible line in his relations with the West. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Shepilov did not stay long. Already in February 1957 he "went upstairs", becoming the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party on questions of ideology. But even there it lasted only a few months, because in the summer of 1957 he made an obvious miscalculation: he joined the majority in the Presidium of the Central Committee, which made an unsuccessful attempt to displace Khrushchev. The first secretary did not forgive him. Shepilov, like other members of the "anti-party group," was immediately removed from all leadership positions. He was firmly entrenched political label, which became essentially his second name - " and joined them with Shepilov ".

Since 1957, for nearly 30 years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by A. A. Gromyko, whose name is associated with many successes of national diplomacy.